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THE SCOPE OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
By JAMES E. FAHEY*
It is provided in the Constitution of the United States that
a work, to be copyrightable, must be the "writings" of an
"author."' The word "writings" is not confined to language
or letters, but embraces all forms by which the ideas in the mind
of the author are given visible expression.2 Consequently instruc-
tion sheets and diagrams,3 catalogue cuts, 4 labels,5 and motion
pictures 6 have all been held "writings" within the constitutional
provision and the copyright acts. It is definitely settled, how-
ever, that the benefits of the copyright law should not be extended
to "ideas" as such,' systems,8 the use of words,9 or the title of a
copyrighted work, apart from the work itself.10 *While the pre-
sent copyright act requires the applicant for a copyright to
state in which of an enumerated group of classes his work
*A.B., University of Kentucky, 1935; LL.B., University of Louis-
ville, 1938; University Fellow, Columbia University Law School, 1938-
1939.
"United States Constitution Art. 1, see. 8.
2Barrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Barony, 111 U.S. 53, 28 L. ed.
349, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 279 (1884).
3 Ideal Aeroplane and Supply Co. v. Brooks, 18 F. Supp. 136 (1937).
'Kaiser & Blair v. The Merchants' Assn., 64 F. (2d) 575 (1933).
'Hoague Sprague Corp. v. Meyer Co., 31 F. (2d) 583 (1929).
6M. G. M. Distributing Co. v. Bijou Theater Co., 3 F. Supp. 66
(1933).
'Affiliated Enterprise v. Gruber, 86 F. (2d) 958 (1936).
'See note 7, supra.
'Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 43 L. ed. 904, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 606
(1899). Otherwise an author might gain a monopoly in certain words.
The order in which the words are employed is, of course, protected.
"Neither the author nor proprietor of a literary work has any
property in its name. It is a term of description which serves to
identify the work." Black v. Ehrich, 44 Fed. 793 (1891). In Kemp &
Beatley v. Hirsch, 34 F. (2d) 291 (1929), the court held a design for
dress goods stamped on paper or on the goods themselves, was not the
subject of copyright, in spite of the plaintiff's contention that his matter
was a design for a work of art within the meaning of Sec. 5 of the Copy-
right Act of March 4, 1909, the court construing this section as applying
only to the so-called fine arts, i.e., paintings, drawings, and sculpturing.
The decision was undoubtedly influenced, by the fact that the plaintiff
might be accoxded adequate protection by obtaining design letters
patent, the court obligingly calling this to the plaintiff's attention.
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belongs," nevertheless it is specifically provided that these speci-
fications shall not be deemed to limit the subject matter of copy-
rightable material previously defined 12 as any writings of an
author.
Thus we see that Congress has used the broadest terms pos-
sible for the extention of the benefits of the Copyright Act to
diverse subject matter. We must look to the decided cases in
this field, however, for the determination of the requisites which
this subject matter must embody.
There are two fundamental requirements, originality and
merit. Since no examination is made at the copyright office as
to these factors it is of the utmost importance that the court
investigate both.13 It is, accordingly, the function of this paper
to analyze the decisions of the courts in an attempt to ascertain
recent trends in the standards demanded by the courts in both
these requirements.
.Many decisions use these terms interchangeably, although
the two have distinctly separate meanings. It is this confusion of
terminology together with utter failure on the part of the courts,
in many of the more recent cases, to realize that they are applying
these tests to the facts, that cause confusion to one who is unfa-
miliar with the field and who is attempting to determine for him-
self the question, whether or not, some particular work at hand
is susceptible to a valid copyright.
If we are to be systematic and formulate some definitely
helpful rules in this field we must first examine the contested
work to determine whether or not it embodies sufficient original-
"
1Act of March 4, 1909, sec. 5. "(a) Books, including composite
and cyclopedic works, directories, gazeteers, and other compilations;
(b) Periodicals, including newspapers; (c) Lectures, sermons, addresses(prepared for oral delivery); (d) Dramatic or dramatico-musical com-
positions; (e) Musical compositions; (f) Maps; (g) Works of art;
models or designs for works of art; (h) Reproductions of a work of art;
(I) Drawings of plastic work of a scientific or technical character;
(j) Photographs; (k) Prints and pictorial illustrations; (1) Motion-
picture photoplays; (in) Motion pictures other than photoplays."
"Act of March 4, 1909, sec. 4.
""A deposit of two copies of the article or work with the Librarian
of Congress with the name of the author and its title page is all that is
necessary to secure a copyright. It is therefore much more important,
that when the supposed author sues for a violation of his copyright the
existence of those facts of originality or intellectual production of
thought and conception on the part of the author should be proved then
as In the case of patent rights." Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v.
Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 28 L. ed. 349, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 279 (1884).
KENTUCKY LAw JOURNAL
ity; if the work should pass this examination it must still be
tested under the rules laid down by the second fundamental
requirement, that of merit.
I. ORIGINALITY
Whenever the abstract rule is laid down by some court that
this or that work has or has not sufficient originality to entitle it
to a valid copyright perhaps the first thought that comes to mind
is that the propounder of the work has so plagiarized some matter
previously published that the courts do not feel his work rises to
the dignity of a copyright. It seems quite natural therefore, to
find courts laying down the rule that a plagiarist is not an
author.14
But if we assume that the courts use originality in the sense
that the work, to be copyrightable, must not be a plagiarism, we
must seek the limits of this term and ask ourselves the question,
what have the courts considered plagiarism?
'When one copies the work of another he
(a) h~s copied a work which is in the public domain.
This can either,
(1) be traced definitely as the product of a known
author, who has neglected to copyright his work or
in which a valid copyright has expired, or,
(2) can be designated as a part of that great fund of
knowledge, the common heritage of mankind,
including traditional plots, folk lore, historical
facts, etc.; or,
(b) has infringed upon the valid copyright of another.
In the first case, (a), the plagiarist is simply denied a copy-
right; in the second, (b), he is also subject to a suit by the party
holding the valid copyright of the infringed work. In either
case, what is important to us is that the work is not entitled to
a valid copyright because a direct or substantially similar copy
of something in the public domain 15 or something previously
"Sheldon v. M.G.M. Pictures Corp. 81 F. (2d) 49, cert. den. 298
U.S. 669, 56 Sup. Ct. Rep. 835, 80 L ed. 1392 (1936).
5Act of March 4, 1909, sec. 7 provides that no copyright shall sub-
sist in the original text of any work which is in the public domain.
This, of course, was no innovation. It should also be noted that by this
same section no copyright can be secured for matter appearing in any
publication qf the United States Government. See also Rule 4, Copy-
right Office.
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validly copyrighted will not support a copyright. A distinguish-
able variation from one of the above classes, however, will sup-
port a copyright, even though it present the same old theme.1'
No attempt can here be made to lay down the rules concern-
ing what is a distinguishable variation. Each, ease must stand
upon its own facts as to how near the details and incidents of
one work can come to the other before the line of plagiarism is
crossed. We wish here, merely to make the point that a dis-
tinguishable variation is not a plagiarism and is not, therefore,
refused copyright for lack of originality.
Another class of cases wherein it is definitely decided that
the author is not guilty of such plagiarism or unoriginality as to
forfeit valid copyright in his work are those cases wherein the
author has so combined some subject matter in the public domain
that his conzbinatiou is readily distinguishable from all other
combinations in the public domain. This situation is aptly illus-
trated in the interesting case of Carr v. Nat'l. Capitol Pressy7
There the plaintiff's card contained Gilbert Stuart's portrait of
George Washington in an inconspicuous oval frame occupying
about one-third of the card. In the upper left hand corner of the
card was a spread eagle standing on the United States Shield
with the customary stars in a blue field across the top and vertical
red and white stripes comprising the lower portion of the shield.




Defendant's card comprised a similar portrait of Washington in
the same inconspicuous oval frame and occupying about one-third
of the card on the right side. Across the upper left of the card
was a spread eagle below which was the outline of a large shield
and within the shield was printed the American's Creed in
eighteen lines of small type. In a suit for infringement the court
held that the principal features of the plaintiff's cards (con-
19 Gerlach-Barklow Co. v. Morris & Bendien, 23 F. (2d) 158 (1927).
It should be noted that a theme is never copyrightable. See Shlpman
v. RK.O. Radio Pictures, 20 F. Supp. 249 (1937).
- 71 F. (2d) 220 (1934).
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sisting of the portrait and the United States Shield) were not
susceptible to exclusive appropriation. The court said further:
"The most the plaintiff can rightfully claim is that she has evolved
an original combination of matter, which standing alone would not be
subject to a copyright."
The court decided that the defendant's combination was not
similar enough to infringe the plaintiff's and in so deciding, of
course, decided that the plaintiff had a valid copyright in the
combination or arrangement of the common subject matter.
Continuing the principle that an author can obtain a valid
copyright in his arrangements of matter publici juris, we find
the case of Jewelers Circular Pub. Co. v. Keystone Pub. Co.,18
illustrative of the point. There the plaintiff's work contained
1,250 trade-mark illustrations, and the court held the fact that
each one of them taken alone might not be copyrightable, failed
to establish the proposition that taken together they may not be
copyrighted.
A third situation, which is but slightly different from
original arrangements of matter in the public domain, is that
wherein the author has taken facts in the public domain and
expressed them in original fashion. Thus the form in which
news is printed can be protected though the news itself cannot
be ;19 the modes of expression in which the conventional laws or
rules of a game may be stated, but not the rules themselves ;20
the language used in presenting a particular problem in the play-
ing of Contract Bridge, but not the particular distribution of the
52 cards in the problem. 21 Historical events, certainly a typical
example of matter in the public domain, of course could not be
copyrighted ;22 but no one would doubt for an instant the copy-
rightability of a treatise on some phase of history. In fact, it
has been held that a volume which shows readily the order of
historical events, cannot be reproduced without the author's
permission if the author has copyrighted his work.23
In holding that a pictorial history of the United States was
38281 Fed. 83 (1922); see also in this connection Guthrie v. Cur-
lett, 36 F. (2d) 694 (1929).
"Chicago Record Herald Co. v. Tribune Assn., 275 Fed. 797 (1921).
"Whist Club v. Foster, 42 F. (2d) 782 (1929).
=Russell v. Northeastern Publishing Co., 7 F. Supp. 571 (1934).
See also Hartfield v. Peterson, 91 F. (2d) 998 (1937).
22Caruthers v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, 20 F. Supp. 903 (1937).
2 Hamson v. Jaccard Jewelry Co., 32 Fed. 202 (1887).
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the proper subject of a valid copyright, the court in Yale Uni-
versity Press v. Row, Peterson 0O.24 stated that the right to copy-
right a book did not depend upon whether or not the materials
collected were publici juris as long as the matter was treated in
an original fashion. "The manner in which the author presented
that material" said the court, "was copyrightable." Similarly,
a copyright may be had for an abridgement, digest, translation,
or dramatization, 25 the test here being the originality represented
by the author's own thought, skill and labor, in ingeniously pre-
senting another's work.
From what. has been said it would seem almost needless to
point out that a writer may draw from all available sources in
creating his writings, and this will in no way effect his ability to
secure a copyright in the work. If this were not true the first
examiner of ancient chronicles might secure for himself a
monopoly upon some particular phase of ancient history.20 A
rule has been stated in this connection which seems to find much
favor in recent cases: As long as the author of a second work
has not copied his predecessor's work, as distinguished from copy-
ing their common material, his predecessor cannot complain
because the former has achieved the same or an essentially
similar result. He cannot complain even though his work by
indicating the common sources has facilitated or led to consulta-
tion of those works by his successor. The scope of copyrighting
2440 F. (2d) 290 (1930).
Z In the extremely interesting case of Rush v. Oursler, 39 F. (2d)
468 (1930), the plaintiff's stage production involved a unique dramatic
incident, In which the audience is made to believe that an actual murder
was committed in their midst. In holding that this was a dramatic
incident which, per se, is not copyrightable (no one could obtain a copy-
right to withdraw from others the right to portray such an occurrence
In literary form) the court said: "The only right the owner of such a
copyright would have, is the right to prevent others from copying the
form In which the author has chosen to dramatize such an occurrence
for the production on the stage. It is not the contents or a dramatic or
literary composition which is protected by copyrighting but the form
and sequence, the incidental, yet, essential adornment and trimmings.
It is not the subject but its treatment that is protected." In Roe-
Lawton v. Hal E. Roach Studios, 18 F. (2d) 126 (1927), the same con-
clusions were reached in regard to photoplays.
"Many of the plays of Shakespeare were framed out of materials
which existed long before his time and were gathered by him from
ancient chronicles, and other dusty receptacles of antiquated literature,
but these dry bones of the past, the poet combined anew, pouring over
them the effulgence of his own genius until they were quickened with
new life and adorned with hitherto unknown beauty." Boucicault v.
Fox, 3 Fed. Cas. 977 (1862).
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in such works is limited so as simply to prevent a subsequent
laborer in the same vineyard from seeking to save time or
trouble by copyrighting his predecessor's work. The drawing
upon available sources and the use of old material by an author
doesn't exclude others from using the same sources and
materials. 27
In summation then, a work may be original in the sense of
the law alth ough the materials of which it is composed can all be
traced out of former works, provided the author by the exercise
of selection, arrangement, combination, editing, or substantially
coloring the facts so as to pour into them his own genius, has
created something substantially new. This may be done in the
form of a distinguishable variation, an original combination, or
merely stating matter in the public domain in an original manner.
Conversely put, one who exercises no mental power 28 in the pro-
duction in concrete form, of an intelligible conception, but
rather slavishly reproduces another's work is not entitled to
copyright his plagiarism. 29
II. IERr
The courts have set up two standards as to the requirement
that a work, to be copyrightable, must embody some intrinsic
merit. The first of these may be designated as the Expenditure
Weil on the Law of Copyrighting, sec. 629, p. 234, cited in Yale
University Press v. Row, Peterson Co., 40 F. (2d) 290 (1930).
18 The Supreme Court ruled in the Trade Mark Cases 100 U.S. 32,
25 L. ed. 550, that the writings to be protected under the Constitutional
provision are only such as are original and are founded in the creative
powers of the mind and consequently do not include trade marks which
require neither novelty, invention, nor any work of the brain but are
simply founded on priority of appropriation.
'9An interesting and important distinction between patents and
copyrights on the score of originality bears consideration. In the case
of patents, the patentee must be the original and first inventor or dis-
coverer. In the case of copyrights it is possible to have a plurality of
valid copyrights directed to closely identical or even identical works
and none of them, if independently arrived at without copying, will
constitute an infringement of the copyright in any of the others. In
Sheldon v. M.G.M. Pictures Corp., 81 F. (2d) 49 (1936); cert. den. 288
U.S. 669, 80 L. ed. 1392, 56 Sup. Ct. Rep. 835, Learned Hand, J., said:
"If by some magic, a man who had not known it, were to compose a new
Keats' 'Ode to a Grecian Urn,' he would be an author and if he copy-
righted it, others might not copy that poem, though they might, of
course, copy Keats'. The copyright, therefore, is valid but there can be
no infringement." Independent translations of the same work are
necessarily very similar but each is entitled to copyright. See In this
connection, Stevenson v. Fox, 226 Fed. 990 (1915).
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nf Labor Theary, and the second we shall call the Reasonable
S kill Theory.
Although the two conflict on principle, no decision has been
discovered which recognizes their incongruity. When one is
expounded the other is completely ignored; where one is adopted
it is considered as the only solution of the presented problem.
Nevertheless the two are definitely present in our body of copy-
right law and must be dealt with if we are to set up standards
for axcertaining in what cases a valid copyright may be obtained
in some contested work. It remains to examine these theories;
ascertain the cases in which one or the other has been adopted
and hazard a generalization as to their future application.
Expenditure of Labor Theory
Under this theory any work upon which labor has been
expended is entitled to copyright, regardless of the intrinsic
merit imbued in it, provided of course it lhas satisfied the other
copyright requirement of originality. The heart of the theory
seems succinctly put in Boucicault v. Fox.30 The court there
said, in substance, that the copyright law rests on no code of com-
parative criticism but protects alike the humblest efforts at
instruction or amusement, the dull productions of plodding
mediocrity, and the most original and imposing displays of
intellectual power, and that it should be liberally construed in
favor of authors, leaving the comparative merits to be settled at
the tribunal of public opinion; "For," said the court, "this will
keep open the springs of thought which feed the intellectual life
of the nation."
The courts under this view do not assume the functions of
critics. They do not measure carefully the degree of literary or
artistic skill involved in the production. Their attitude is that
if the work has enough merit and value to be the subject of
piracy, it should also be of sufficient importance to be entitled
to protection.3 1
The recent case of Leon v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph
Co.3' sets forth the arguments in favor of this theory in a con-
"Fed. Cas. No. 1,691 (1862).
" Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 47 L. ed.
40, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 298 (1903); Henderson v. Tompkins, 60 Fed. 758
(1894).
"' 91 F. (2d) 484 (1937).
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vincing manner. In holding that the plaintiff's telephone direc-
tory was susceptible to valid copyright, the court stated first
of all that such compilations were specifically made copyrightable
by the Copyright Act ;33 secondly, the court adopted the follow-
ing argument against denying relief: Should the courts give
boundary to the Constitutional grant and deny the protection of
the copyright statute except where intrinsic merit manifested
itself, many of the writings to which protection ought to be given,
as a matter of policy, must be excluded.3 4 Here, as elsewhere,
the constitution, under judicial construction has expanded to
new conditions as they arose. Little by little copyrights have
been extended to the literature of commerce so that now it
includes books that the old guild of authors would have dis-
dained; catalogues, mathematical tables, statistics, designs, guide
books, directories, and other worls of similar character. It would
seem that nothing which evinces in some substantial way the
mind of the creator or originator, is excluded.
A belief that in no other way can the labor of the brain in
these useful departments of life be adequately protected is doubt-
less responsible for such a wide departure, in this case, from
what unquestionably was the original purpose of the constitu-
tional provision. But obviously, even under this view, the
expansion process must come to a halt at some point, and the
Leon case, though the language is anything but plain upon this
point, seems to draw the line at the recital of events in the form
of annals; the reduction to copy of an event that others, in a
like situation, would have observed in such form as people gener-
ally would have adopted. Similarly courts have denied copy-
right protection where the article is publish.ed, not for inform-
ation or explanation, but for use itself, such as blank forms, letter
,files, indices, and similar mere conveniences and devices for the
conduct of business. 35
The courts, in recent years, have been more inclined to
adopt the Expenditure of Labor Theory in advertising cases than
in any other field. The case of Azshel v. Puritan Pharmacoutical
Co.3 6 aptly illustrates this tendency. The plaintiff, a dealer in
'3Act of March 4, 1909, sec. 5, sub sec. (a).
4 Of course at the time the constitution was adopted the question
of applying copyright protection to other than strictly literary produc-
tions had never been propounded.
UAmberg File & Index Co. v. Shea Smith Co., 82 Fed. 314 (1897).
61 F. (2d) 131 (1932).
COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
cosmetics and toilet articles bearing the trade name "Vivani,"
prepared a distinctive advertisement composed of a group of
photographs of articles to be sold together with descriptive
matter. He secured a copyright registration and published his
advertisement with notice of copyright in various newspapers.
The defendant, who was engaged in selling similar articles,
published an advertisement of its products which was similar, in
wording and in general arrangement, to that of the plaintiff's
copyrighted advertisement. Plaintiff brought suit for infringe-
ment, and the defense was pleaded that there was not sufficient
merit to the plaintiff's advertisement to warrant the procurement
of a valid copyright therein. The court ignored the merit plea
in toto and laid down the rule that a newspaper advertisement
having some degree of originality is the proper subject of copy-
right. Whether the liberality in this field was produced by the
strong language found in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing
Co.3 or by the ability of big business to hire counsel of sufficient
prowess to convert the courts to the views of their clients is of
course problematic. The latter thought, however, is somewhat
weakened by the fact that advertising men do not themselves
consider plagiarism as a serious offense but apparently accept
it as a part of the business game.3 8 Since modern economic
theorists tend to discourage rather than encourage advertising on
:7188 U.S. 239, 47 L. ed. 460, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 298 (1903). It had
been formerly held that if an illustration or a pamphlet containing
illustrations had no other purpose than that of a mere advertisement,
it was not promotive of the useful arts within the meaning of the copy-
right constitutional provision so as to be a proper subject of copyright.
Mott Iron Works v. Clow, 104 Fed. 316 (1897). However the Bleistein
case, which is the leading case representing the modern and more
liberal view, held that a circus poster which served no other purpose
than to advertise, was the proper subject of copyright. However it
should be noted that the Bleistein case held merely that if the work was
otherwise subject to copyright it was not defeated in this purpose
because It was an advertisement. "A picture is none the less a pic-
ture", said the court, "and none the less a subject of copyright, that it
is used for an advertisement." The Anshel case goes much further,
in that it dispenses altogether with the requirement of merit and
allows the valid copyrighting of an advertisement so long as it has some
slight degree of originality whether it is peculiarly illustrated or is
merely a compilation of information. To the same effect see: Norris
v. No-Leak-O Piston Ring Co., 277 Fed. 961 (1921); De Prato Statuary
Co. v. Glulaina Statuary Co., 189 Fed. 90 (1911).
'How 8,000 Imitators Contributed to Canada Dry's Success, 11
Sales Management 25, July 10, 1926.
L. J.-3
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large scale proportions, 9 it would seem better to curtail this
liberal tendency.
Under the Expenditure of Labor Theory, then, the Con-
stitutional copyright grant is viewed as having expanded to meet
new conditions as they arose and since the courts which adopt
this theory feel that there is a definite need for the protection of
the literature of commerce, the only test of merit set up is: Did
the applicant actually embody sufficient labor into his work to
earn for himself the reward of copyright? The process of
expansion in this direction seems however to stop at the point
where the article is published, not for information or explana-
tion, but for use itself, or where the recordation is that of a mere
annal.
Reasonable Skill Theory
Under this theory, the work must evince in its make-up some
definite mental endowment in order to show "authorship" with-
in the meaning of the constitutional copyright grant.4" Thus
it would seem that notations at which stocks or serials have sold
or of the result of a horse race or a baseball game could not be
said to bear the impression of merit, though they embodied labor
in their collection and presentation, and therefore fail to rise to
the plane of authorship. 41
Accordingly the court in West Publishing Co. v. Thompson
Co.42 decided that the aggregation of old material into a single
publication does not amount to ordinary skill sufficient to lend
copyrightability. It was held that the mere aggregation of the
Weekly Reporters into volumes does not constitute a new work.
But the compilation and rearrangement and reclassification of
the syllabi in the digest into a new and larger digest does consti-
tute a new work entitled to copyright.43
Just as the field of advertisement seemed to have peculiarly
lent itself to the Expenditure of Labor Theory, the field of music
has in recent years, been made the exclusive territory of the
Reasonable Skill Theory. The theory is, of course, invoked more
frequently where arrangements of music in the public domain
2 Your Money's Worth, Chase and Schlink.
' United States Constitution, Art. I, see. 8.
4'Natl. Tele. News Co. v. Western Union Tele. Co., 119 Fed. 294
(1902).
4'176 Fed. 837 (1910).43 West. Pub. Co. v. Thompson, supra, note 42.
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are in question. It seems almost the universal rule that for an
arrangement to be copyrightable it must be a substantially new
adaptation of the composition. Accordingly in Arnstein v. The
Marx Music Corp. 4 the court h.eld that a musical work to be
copyrighted must indicate an exercise of inventive powers as
distinguished from mere mechanical skill or change.
The case of Norden v. Oliver Ditzen C0.4 is an interesting
one and seems characteristic of the stringent standard of merit
demanded of musical compositions. There the plaintiff wrote
original words for an old Russian hymn in the public domain.
These words necessitated rythmical changes in the music to
the extent of the number of syllables used in the Russian version.
The defendant used the plaintiff's music in toto and wrote
original words. An infringement suit was started and the court
held that music, to be copyrightable, must be substantially new
and meritorious work. Changes simply in the length of notes
and not in tbke original harmony do not involve sufficient merit to
warrant a copyright, and the plantiff was consequently denied
relief.
The courts which adopt this, the Resasonable Skill Theory,
then, take the attitude that since copyrights are dispensed under
the Constitutional grant of power, "to promote th.e progress of
science and the useful arts", a work to be copyrightable must
not only be useful but also must possess literary or artistic merit.
Copyrights, under this view, are not for the encouragement of
mere industry, unconnected with learning and the sciences.
W'hich of these theories will be applied to a contested work
seems a puzzling question indeed since no court has, as yet,
marked our path with sign posts determining what factors will
bring a work under one or the other of these rules. The only
rationale offered is that the courts will apply whichever of these
theories seem to them the most expedient in any given situation.
Further than the generalization that public policy governs the
courts in their choice, we cannot go. However, we may venture
I'11 F. Supp. 535 (1935). The plaintiff alleged defendant's selec-
tion "Play Fiddle Play" infringed his composition "I Love You Madly".
The court held that the defendant had not proved his contention that
plaintiff's composition was not original and that certain combinations
of notes of melodies in it were to be found in previous musical composi-
tions of some of the great music masters of the past.
'm'13 F. Supp. 415 (1936).
"Art. I, sec. 8.
30 KENTUCKY LAw JOURNAb
the assertion that where the work is one which has been con-
sidered historically as within the scope of copylight protection,
that is, drama, music, literature, and the fine arts, the courts are
inclined to adopt the stricter Reasonable Skill Theory; while if
the work is not one which might be considered within the histor-
ical scope of copyright protection so as to have been within the
general purview of the framers of the Constitutional provision
concerning copyrights, a more liberal tendency has been grad-
ually evinced, evoluting into the Expenditure of Labor Theory.
This tendency seems to have been brought about by a strong feel-
ing on the part of the courts that some type of protection should
be afforded the labor of mankind in important departments of'
social intercourse, which exact of their laborers routine perform-
ance rather than imposing displays of intellectual prowess, and
that the copyright niche in our legal jurisprudence seems best
fitted to afford it.
III. CIMAN HANDS
Regardless of which of the two theories of merit a court may
deem expedient to adopt it is on all hands agreed that an im-
moral or indecent 47 or seditious or libelous 48 work is not enti-
tled to copyright protection. Moreover, if an author has been
guilty of inequitable conduct in the production of his work the
benefits of the copyright law will not be extended to him.4"
Before such protection will be refused, however, it must be shown
that there is something immoral, pernicious, or indecent in the
work per se, or that it is incapable of any use except in con-
nection with some illegal or immoral act.50  By the same token
advertisements which do not faithfully describe the wares of the
vendor, but tend rather to mislead and deceive are denied pro-
tection.5 1 We find relaxation of the Clean Hands Doctrine, how-
41 Barnes v. Miner, 122 Fed. 480 (1903).
4Harms v. Stern, 231 Fed. 645 (1916).
However, the meretricious conduct must be definitely connected
with the matter in controversy. See Corey v. Physical Culture Hotel,
14 F. Supp. 977 (1936), where the court intimates that trespassing upon
the regulations of the Department of Air Commerce, in order to secure
an aeriai photograph, is not conduct so definitely affecting the plaintiff's
copyright as to destroy its validity.
Richardson v. Miller, Fed. Cas. No. 11,791 (1877).
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over, in the recent case of Simonton v. Gordomn. 2 It was there
held that a copyright will be protected in a work on the border-
line of indecency when the copyright is contested by the author of
an equally questionable work.
-12F. (2d) 116 (1929).
